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Who Makes the Call on Capital Punishment? How Ring
v. Arizona Clarifies the Apprendi Rule and the
Implications on Capital Sentencing
I. INTRODUCTION

State legislatures have set up capital sentencing schemes that operate
on the outskirts of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a criminal trial by
an impartial jury. In their attempts to reconcile the constitutional
guarantees of the Eighth and Sixth Amendments and their interpretations
by the Supreme Court, states have been caught between a proverbial rock
and a hard place regarding the procedure of sentencing a defendant to
death. The creative sentencing systems of several states are under
scrutiny in light of the Supreme Court's most recent ruling. The impact
of the decision has caused legislatures nationwide to get in line with the
amorphous death penalty jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and find
alternative solutions to capital sentencing.

A. Background
The constitutional right of trial by jury was upheld in a 7-2 decision
by the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona. 1 In Ring, the Supreme Court
held that a violation of the Sixth Amendment exists where a trial judge,
sitting alone, enhances the maximum sentence of life in prison by
imposing the death penalty because of "aggravating factors" that are not
part of the elements proven for the jury's guilty verdict.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that any fact that enhances the
maximum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, regardless of whether the fact is an element of the offense or a
sentencing consideration, and in so doing overruled its holding in Walton
v. Arizona. 2 The Court also clarified and bolstered its ruling of Apprendi

I. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). Justice Ginsberg wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Souter, and Thomas. Justice O 'Connor dissented, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
2. 497 U.S . 466 (1990).
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v. New Jersey, 3 thereby causing a frenzy of reform among state
4
legislatures whose sentencing schemes came under scrutiny.
The types of sentencing schemes questioned were constructed by
state legislatures in order to be in harmony with the Eighth Amendment
requirement against "cruel and unusual punishment." 5 The schemes also
sought to be in accordance with the Court's suggestion in Gregg v.
Georgia6 that states should apply special procedural safeguards when
seeking the death penalty. The states argued that their sentencing
procedures were established in line with stare decisis principles of capital
punishment jurisprudence leading up to Walton and Apprendi.
Although the Supreme Court reached the correct result in
safeguarding the constitutionality of the sentencing procedure that
imposes the ultimate penalty, it did not go far enough in providing clear
standards for the states to follow. The ruling in Ring leaves many
unanswered questions regarding the unanimity requirement of the jury
during sentencing, the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors
for imposing capital punishment, and deference to national and
international norms and trends in this area of American jurisprudence.
More importantly, however, the Court has established a theoretical
foundation for a bifurcated system of prosecuting and sentencing capital
offenses that extends the defendant's presumption of innocence into the
sentencing realm and creates a presumption to preserve the convicted
person's life.
Part II of this note discusses the controversy that existed in capital
punishment sentencing that led to the decision in Ring v. Arizona by
tracing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the last thirty years. Part III
sets forth the factual background and procedural history of Ring and
analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV
further analyzes the holding and considers the quantitative consequences
and impact of Ring on the legal system. It also analyzes the qualitative
impact on death penalty jurisprudence in the context of the roles of the
jury in the sentencing phase and of judicial deference to national and
world opinions of capital punishment and capital punishment's inherent

3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. The constitutionality of the sentencing statute in Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703
(200 I), was stricken by the Supreme Court in Ring. The validity of similar statutes in the following
states was also called into question: Alabama (see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (200 I));
Colorado (see COLO. REV. STAT.§ 16-11-103 (2001)); Delaware (see DEL. CODE ANN ., tit I I,§
4209 (1995)); Florida (see FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West 2001)); Idaho (see IDAHO CODE § 192515 (Michie 2001)); Indiana (see IND. CODE ANN . § 35-50-2-9 (West 2001); Montana (see MONT.
CODE ANN.§ 46-18-301 (1997)); Nebraska (see NEB. REV. STAT.§ 29-2520 ( 1995)).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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sentencing procedures. Part V briefly discusses legislative alternatives
regarding capital sentencing statutes and schemes that should seek to be
in harmony with Ring.
II. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING SENTENCING S CHEMES

States have struggled historically in drafting sentencing guidelines
that are in compliance with the Eighth Amendment requirement to avoid
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment by imposing the death penalty
only on the most socially reprehensible offenses. The effort is
complicated when the sentencing system must also conform with the
Sixth Amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant "shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury."7
This endeavor to create a system for imposing the death penalty that
is fair to the accused and at the same time uses the State's resources
efficiently is made more problematic by the amorphous jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court of the last thirty years regarding capital punishment
and its sentencing.
One can trace this confusion to the Supreme Court' s decision in
Furman v. Georgia8 where the Court effectively placed a moratorium on
death sentences by holding capital punishment, as then practiced,
unconstitutional. Furman, however, did not signify the end of executions
in the United States, as anti-death penalty advocates certainly had hoped.
The Court changed its analysis only a few years later and upheld the
constitutionality of a reformed capital punishment statute in Gregg v.
. 9
Georgra.
In Gregg , the Court held that capital punishment did not always
violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that retribution and
possible deterrence of future capital crimes were sufficient reasons to
allow the imposition of death as a penalty. 10 Under the Georgia
sentencing scheme at issue in Gregg, a prerequisite for imposing the
death penalty required specific jury findings of aggravating and
mitigating factors such as the circumstances of the crime or the character
of the defendant. The Georgia Supreme Court, in addition to considering
the legal issues on appeal, would also compare each capital sentence with
the sentences imposed on defendants similarly situated in order to avoid
a "wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty." 11

7. U.S . CONST. amend . VI.
8. 408 u.s. 238, 238 (1 972).
9. 428 U.S. 153,207 ( 1976).
10. /d. at !83.
II. /d. a t 224.
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The Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence was further
12
muddled by later decisions in Walton v. Arizona, Jones v. United
14
States, 13 and Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Walton Court, in deciding
the constitutionality of the same statute at issue in Ring, held that the
state was not required to designate certain aggravating factors as
"elements" of the underlying offense in order to impose the death
penalty. 15 More importantly, the highly divided Court also held that
Arizona was not required to allow only the jury to determine the
existence of the aggravating factors. 16 The ruling in Walton, therefore,
left open the possibility for capital punishment to be solely at the
discretion of the sentencing judge who, sitting alone, could find the
presence of aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence and
sentence the accused to death.
The issue and rule in Walton proved to be very divisive for the high
Court. In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court heard arguments
relating to the statutory interpretation of a sentencing scheme that
permitted sentencing enhancements to be made by the judge when no
17
recommendation to add to the sentence was included in the indictment.
The Court explained the limitations on judiciary sentencing by giving a
thorough historical background and holding that the limitations on judges
regarding sentencing enhancements were based on the Due Process
Clause and the Sixth Amendment that require "any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty of a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." 18 The Supreme Court also held that the states may not
circumvent the due process limitations of In re Winship 19 by not
presenting facts to the juries that increase the severity of the possible
penalty. 2 Finally, the Jones Court reiterated that the general rule
continues to be that every fact that might expand the statutory maximum
penalty must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 1

°

12. 497 U.S. 639 ( 1990).
13. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
14. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
15. Walton, 497 U.S. at647. Thi s case was decided by a narrow 5-4 majority.
16. !d.
17. Jones, 526 U.S. at 232.
18. /d. at 243 n.6.
19. 397 U.S. 358 ( 1970). The Supreme Court clarified the due process limitations in criminal
cases by holding that the govern ment must prove beyond a reasonab le doubt every element of the
crime for which the defendant is accused. !d. at 364.
20. Jones, 526 U.S. at 240-41 .
21. !d. at 248-49.
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The Apprendi Court confirmed the opinion it expressed in Jones and
held that the constitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments require that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 22 The majority considered that
the answer to the issue of whether judge or jury makes the call
conceming sentencing enhancement was foreshadowed in Jones, where
the Court noted that the aggravating facts must be submitted to the jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 23 The Apprendi majority, like the
majority in Jones, also relied on the "historic link between verdict and
judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate
within the limits of the legal penalties." 24 Moreover, the Apprendi Court
believed that "[t]he judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer
limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury."25
States have been given a confusing and ever-changing constitutional
roadmap regarding the imposition of the death penalty because of the
holdings of Walton, Jones, and Apprendi. These cases have also made it
more difficult for the states to reconcile constitutional guarantees with
procedural safeguards in order to avoid an "arbitrary" and "freakish"
death penalty. 26 The divisive issue of who makes the call- judge or
jury-to enhance the statutory maximum sentence was again taken up by
the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona. This time, the issue included the
question of what the constitutional procedural safeguards are surrounding
the imposition ofthe ultimate penalty.
Ill. RING V. ARIZONA: THE STATUTE, THE FACTS, AND THE HOLDINGS

A. Background
1. The statute
At issue in Ring was an Arizona sentencing statute which directed
the trial judge to "conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the
existence ... of [certain enumerated] circumstances ... for the purpose
of determining the sentence to be imposed." 27 The statute further directed

22. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).

21 Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49.
24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482.
25. Jd. at 483 n.1 0.
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
27. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2434 (2002) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13703(C) (West 2001)).
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that "[t]he hearing shall be conducted before the court alone ... [and] the
court alone shall make all factual determinations" required by the
sentencing statute, the United States Constitution, or the Constitution of
the State of Arizona. 28
The sentencing procedure under this regime, therefore, required that
a defendant could not be put to death unless there were additional
findings of fact to the essential elements of the underlying offense. The
sentencing considerations under this sentencing procedure required that
the findings of fact be found by a preponderance of the evidence
following a guilty verdict by the jury.

2. Thefacts
Timothy Ring, James Greenham, and William Ferguson hijacked a
Wells Fargo armored truck on November 28, 1994, when one of the
couriers left the van to get money from a department store. 29 The truck
and its driver were later found by the police. The driver was found inside
the truck, fatally wounded by a single gun shot to the head . "[M]ore than
$562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks were missing from the van." 30
Timothy Ring was the accused shooter and mastermind of the plot. 31

3. Procedural history
a. Arizona trial court. "The trial judge instructed the jury on
alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony murder" in
connection with the armed robbery. 32 "The jury deadlocked on the
premeditated murder offense, with 6 of the 12 jurors voting to acquit"
Ring.33 The jury returned a guilty verdict for the felony murder charge,
which is a first-degree murder under Arizona law. 34
Following the procedure dictated by § 13-703, the trial judge, sitting
alone, entered his "Special Verdict, sentencing Ring to death." 35 The
judge's findings recognized "that Ring was eligible for the death penalty
only if he was [the driver' s] actual killer or if he was 'a major participant

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See ARIZ. R EV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-703(C) (West 2001 ).
Ring , 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
!d. at 2433.
!d. at 2435 .
!d. at 2433.
ld
!d. at 2433-34 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-IIOS(A)-(B) (West 200 I)).
!d. at 2435.
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in the armed robbery that led to the killing and exhibited a reckless
disregard or indifference for human life. '"36
During the sentencing hearing, one of Ring's associates testified
against him and pointed him out as the leader of the offense who plotted
and executed the robbery and the subsequent murder of the driver. 37
After the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found, by a preponderance of
the evidence, two of the enumerated aggravating factors necessary to
sentence Ring to death. 38 "First, the judge determined that Ring had
committed the offense in expectation of receiving something of
'pecuniary value,' as described in § 13-703 .... Second, the judge found
that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner. " 39
b. Arizona Supreme Court. "On appeal, Ring argued that the capital
sentencing scheme in Arizona violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights ... because it entrusts to a judge the finding of a fact
raising the defendant's maximum penalty."40 His constituti9nal attack of
the sentencing scheme was based on the apparent irreconcilability of
Walton, Jones, and Apprendi.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings,
noting that the United States Supreme Court had upheld the sentencing
system as constitutional in Walton v. Arizona. 41 Moreover, the Arizona
Supreme Court also stated that Walton and Apprendi remained good law
and that it was bound to follow those rulings due to stare decisis
principles.
The state high court, however, made two notable observations
regarding Apprendi and Jones . First, the court said that Apprendi and
Jones "'raise[d] some questions about the continued viability of
Walton'," 42 notably that the majority in Jones and Apprendi refused to
expressly overrule Walton. Thus, Walton remained the controlling
authority on point, and "the apparent scope of Apprendi and Jones [was]
not as broad as some of the language of the two opinions suggest[ ed]. " 43
Second, the Arizona Supreme Court examined the Apprendi majority's

36. !d. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a-47a; and citing Tison v. Arizona, 48 1 U.S. 137
( 1987) ("holding that Eighth Amendment pem1its execution of fe lony-murder defendant, who did
not kill or attempt to kill, but who was a 'major participa[nt] in the felony committed ' and who
demonstrated ' reckless indifference to human life "')).
37. /d.
38. ld
39. ld (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a).
40. /d. at 2436.
4!. ld
42. /d. (citing State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1150 (2001)).
43. See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1150.
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interpretation of state law and noted that Apprendi "described Arizona's
sentencing system as one that 'required judges, after a jury verdict
holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating
factors before imposing a sentence of death,' and not as a system that
'permit[ed] a judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes a
44
crime a capital offense. "'
The Arizona Supreme Court distinguished this case in form, seeking
to uphold the sentencing scheme on the grounds that the judicial factfinding during the sentencing portion of the trial was not for elements of
the underlying offense, but rather were sentencing factors for
establishing punishment. Furthermore, the court noted that the Apprendi
dissent "squarely rejected" the Walton ruling with regards to the
sentencing scheme insofar that "[a] defendant convicted of first-degree
murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unl ess a judge makes
the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists.
Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the
defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death penalty."45
" The Arizona high court concluded that" the sentencing scheme at
issue is "precisely as described in Justice O'Connor's dissent" in
Apprendi and that Ring 's death sentence required judicial fact-finding.46
Despite the court's reading of Arizona law, the court "was bound by the
Supremacy Clause" to apply Walton, which had not been overruled, and
finally "rejected Ring's constitutional attack on [Arizona's] capital
murder judicial sentencing system."47

B. United States Supreme Court Opinions
The United States Supreme Court granted Ring's petition for a writ
of certiorari in order to "allay uncertainty in the lower courts caused by
the manifest tension between Walton and the reasoning of Apprendi.'-48
In a seven to two split, the majority decided the following question:
Whether the aggravating factor(s) that allow the imposition of the death
44. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1 151 ).
45. !d.
46. /d. (citing State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 279).
47. ld
48. !d. The Court cited several C ircuit Court of Appeals dec isions that raised questi ons about
reconciling Walton with the Apprendi rule, including: United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150. 159160 (4th Cir. 2001 ) (en bane) ("calling the continued authority of Walton in light of Apprendi
' perplex ing, " ' Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436); Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 542 (9th Cir. 200 1)
(stating that "Apprendi may raise some doubt about Walton," Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436); People v.
Kaczmarek, 741 N.E.2d 11 3 1, 11 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000) (arguing, "(W]hil c it appears
Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than cap ita l, defendants. the
Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we arc in no pos ition to second-g uess that decision
here." Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436-37).
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penalty may be found by the trial judge, sitting alone, or whether the
Sixth Amendment guarantee to a jury trial requires the factor(s) to be
found by an impartial jury. 49

1. Majority and concurrences
The majority began its discussion by mentioning the ruling of
Walton, which upheld the sentencing scheme in Arizona because,
according to Hildwin v. Florida, "the Sixth Amendment does not require
that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of
death be made by the jury."50 The Walton Court reasoned that under the
Arizona statute and sentencing scheme, the aggravating factors were not
essential elements of the underlying offense required to be found by the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, "they ranked as 'sentencing
considerations' guiding the choice between life and death." 51
The Ring majority paid special attention to Justice Stevens's dissent
in Walton where he "urged that the Sixth Amendment requires 'a jury
determination of facts that must be established before the death penalty
may be imposed. "'52 The Walton dissent reasoned, and the Ring majority
agreed, that the aggravating factors at issue operated as statutory
elements of capital murder under Arizona law and the death penalty
would be unavailable in their absence. 53 Therefore, the aggravating
factors were required to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 54
The majority also relied on the historical background of jury
sentencing, reasoning that if the question had been raised in 1791, when
the Sixth Amendment had been drafted, it would have been clearly
answered. Again, relying on Stevens's dissent in Walton, the Court noted
that in the late 18th Century
the jury had the power to determine not only whether the defendant was
guilty of homicide but also the degree of the offense. Moreover, the
jury's role infindingfacts that would determine a homicide defendant's
eligibility ./(>r capital punishment was particularly well established.
Throughout its history, the jury determined which homicide defendants

49. Ring. 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
50. /d. at 2437 (quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638,
640-641 ))
5 1. !d. (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 648). A year before Walton, the Court had deni ed a Sixth
Amendment challenge to Florida's capital sentencing scheme, in which the jury recommends a
sentence. but makes no explicit fact finding on the presence of aggravating circumstances. See
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 63S ( 1989).
52. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2438 (citing Walwn, 497 U.S. at 709).
53. !d.
54. ld
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would be subject to capital punishment by making factual
determinations, many of which related to difficult assessments of the
defendant's state of mind . By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted,
55
the jury' s right to make these determinations was unqucstioned

This historical perspective, the Court found, favored Ring 's
argument of his Sixth Amendment right and his constitutional attack of
the Arizona sentencing scheme.
The Ring Court upheld the constitutional attack because it fell
squarely under the Apprendi rule and the reasoning of Jones. The
Apprendi rule is, in large part, a derivative of the position of the Court in
Jones, where the majority clearly explained that the Constitution
guarantees that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 56 The
Apprendi Court also clarified that the dispositive question "is one not of
form, but of effect," 57 reasoning that " [i]f a State makes an increase in a
defendant 's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact,
that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 x Justice Scalia noted in his concurring
opinion that "all the facts which must exist in order to subject the
defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury"
regardless whether the facts , i.e., aggravating factors, were labeled
elements of the offense or sentencing considerations or any permutation
ofboth. 5Y
The Ring majority asserted that the Arizona Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Apprendi rule overlooked the essential standard that
"the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect. "6 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned, if the State's interpretation of the Apprendi rule was
upheld, the rule would be rendered "a 'meaningless and formalistic' rule
of statutory drafting"6 1 which would not resolve the tension between
Walton and Apprendi.
The Supreme Court noted that the Apprendi rule emphatically
instructs that "the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an
'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the question

°

55. !d. (citing Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penaltv: The Scope of" a CapiTal
Def"endant 's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAM I' L.REV. 1, I 0-11 ( 19X9)).
56. Jones v. Un ited States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 ( 1999).
57. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466, 494 (2000).
58. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 243 9.
59. Apprendi, 530 U.S . at 499.
60. !d. at 494 .
61. Ring , 122 S. Ct. at 2441 (citing Apprendi. 530 U.S. at 541 ).
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'who decides,' judge or jury."62 Rather, the Apprendi Court ruled that
"[ w]hen the term 'sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase
beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the
.
' s gm·1 ty verd.1ct. " 63JUry
In addition to the Apprendi rule, the Ring majority relied on stare
decisis principles to overrule Walton and strike down the Arizona capital
sentencing scheme. The Court referred back to Maynard v. Cartwright, 64
where th e Court held that "[s]ince Furman, our cases have insisted that
the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the
death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently
minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."65 In more
recent cases, the Court explained that it had "interpreted the Constitution
to require the addition of an element or elements to the definition of a
criminal offense in order to narrow its scope."66 It continued to explain
that "[i]f a legislature responded to one of these decisions by adding the
element we held constitutionally required, surely the Sixth Amendment
guarantee would apply to that element."67
Countering Arizona's argument that judicial authority over finding
aggravating factors would be a better way to safeguard against arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty, the majority reasoned that the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury trial "does not tum on the relative
rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders." 68 The Court
also noted that "the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is
far from evident" and that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme is in the
minority to the other states that impose the death penalty and that have
"responded to this Court's Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the
presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting
those determinations to the jury."69

62. Jd
63. !d. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
64. 486 U.S. 356 ( 1988). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23.
65. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.
66. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 56 1-62 (1995)
(suggesting that the addition of an "express jurisdictional element" to a federal gun possession
statute would render the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
67. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442.
6K fd.
69. !d. The majority found that 29 of the 38 States that impose capital punishment generally
commit sentenci ng decisions to juries. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska entrust the
judge with capi tal sentenc ing factfin ding and the ultimate deci sion to impose the death penalty.
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana have "hybrid" sentencing schemes in which the jury
returns an advisory verdict but the judge makes th e ultimate determination for imposing capital
punishment. ld at 2442 n.6.
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The majority finally ruled that the Sixth Amendment requires that
the jury must find any aggravating factors that determine capital
punishment, particularly under Arizona's capital sentencing regime,
because the "enumerated aggravating factors operate as the 'functional
70
equivalent"' of elements of the underlying offense. The Court also
warned that "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the
factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years,
but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death." 71
Justice Scalia concurred that Walton needed to be overturned in
order to avoid further tension with Apprendi. He reluctantly explained
that the Supreme Court had caused the problem in the first place, noting
that "[w]hat compelled Arizona (and many other states) to specify
particular 'aggravating factors' that must be found before the death
penalty can be imposed . .. was the line of this Court's cases beginning
with Furman v. Georgia." 72 In other words, Scalia complained that the
issue had become troublesome because the Supreme Court had coerced
the states into developing a sentencing scheme using aggravating factors
to narrow the field of murderers eligible for death, beginning with
Furman and continuing through Apprendi.
Scalia expressed that the line of decisions since Furman "had no
proper foundation in the Constitution," and it would have been " [b Jetter
for the Court to have invented an evidentiary requirement that a judge
can find by a preponderance of the evidence" than to bring jurors into the
picture. 73 Even so, he agreed with the majority that "the fundamental
meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all
facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant
receives .. . must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,"
regardless of what the states label those facts-i.e .. elements of the
74
offense or sentencing factors.
Scalia admitted in concurring that he is bothered by "the accelerating
propensity of both state and federal legislatures to adopt 'sentencing
factors' determined by judges that increase punishment beyond what is
75
authorized by the jury's verdict." The observation of this trend led him

70.
71.
72.
73.

/d. at 2443.

!d.
!d. at 2444.
ld
74. ld
75 . ld at 2445.
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to believe that "our people's traditional belief in the right of trial by jury
is in perilous decline." 76
In a terse concurrence, Justice Kennedy expressed his opinion that
Apprendi had been wrongly decided, but now that it is the law "its
holding must be implemented in a principled way." 77 Justice Breyer also
concurred in the judgment and reasoned that the Supreme Court in Gregg
v. Georgia had held that the Eighth Amendment "requires the states to
apply special procedural safeguards when they seek the death penalty,"
and that those safeguards include a requirement that "a jury impose any
sentence of death." 7R
Although Justice Breyer concurred with the majority, he was
troubled by "the continued difficulty of justifying capital punishment in
terms of its ability to deter crime, incapacitate offenders, or rehabilitate
criminals." 79 He offered five reasons as to why the death penalty, as
currently administered, should be abandoned. Those reasons can be
summarized as follows: (I) The death penalty is irreversible, and this
irreversibility is especially egregious when the defendant is wrongfully
convicted, as is "underscored by the continued division of opinion" and
recent DNA testing which showed that many capital crime convictions
had proved unreliable; 80 (2) the "potentially arbitrary application" of the
death penalty as demonstrated by the seemingly important factors of race
and socioeconomic background of the defendant in death penalty
convictions; 81 (3) the "delays that increasingly accompany sentences of
death make those sentences unconstitutional because of 'the suffering
inherent in a prolonged wait for execution"'; 82 (4) inadequate
representation in capital defenses aggravates the other shortcomings
mentioned above; 83 and (5) "other nations have increasingly abandoned
capital punishment."84 Justice Breyer concluded that "the danger of
76. ld

77.ld
78. Jd at 2446 (citing Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,515 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
79. !d
80. !d at 2447.
8 1. !d Justice Breyer presented information that showed a "'pattern of evidence indicating
racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty."' !d (citing U.S.
General Accounting Oflice, Report to Senate and House Committees on the Judici ary: Death Penalty
Sentencing 5 (Feb. 1990)).
82. !d at 2448 (citing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 ( 1999)).
83. !d
84. !d Justice Breyer commented on the disparity between the imposition of the death
penalty in the United States as it compares worldwide and noted "that other nations have
increasingly abandoned capital punishment." ld He offers several sources in support of this
proposition.
See, e.g., San Martin, US. Taken to Task Over Death Penalty, MIAMI HERALD, May 31 ,
200 I, p. I (United States is only Western industrialized Nation that authorizes the death

336

. B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume XVII

unwarranted imposition of the penalty cannot be avoided unless 'the
decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a
single governmental official. ,xs Justice Breyer expressed his concerns
regarding the flaws of the American capital sentencing system but
offered guidance with regards to reforming the current sentencing
standards to better ensure constitutional guarantees.

2. The dissent
Justice O 'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented for the same
reasons they dissented in Apprendi. They argued in Ring that the "rule
that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated as an
element of the crime is not required by the Constitution, by history, or by
[the Supreme Court's) prior cases." 86
The dissent expressed concern over the "severely destabilizing
effect" that the rule in Ring will have on the criminal justice system and
predicted that the number of appeals before the courts due to Apprendi
would grow even worse.87 The dissent's worry, however, that the ruling
in Ring will cause "an enormous increase in the workload of an already
overburdened judiciary" overlooks the fact that constitutional guarantees,
and the preservation of human life, should always trump inconvenience
and overtime hours by the judiciary. 88

pena lty); Amnesty International Website Aga inst the Death Penalty, Facts and Figures on
the Death Penalty, (2002) http://www.web.amnesty.org/nnp/dplibrary.nsf (since Gregg,
II I countries have ei ther abandoned the penalty a ltogether, reserved it only for
exceptional crimes like wartime crimes, or have not carried out executions for at least the
past 10 years); De Young, Group Criticizes U.S. on Detainee Policy; Amnesty Warns of
Human Rights Fallout, WASH INGTON POST, May 28, 2002 , p. A4 (the United Slates rates
fourth in number of executions, after China, Iran, and Saud i Arabia) .
Jd

85. !d. (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,469 ( 1984)).
86. /d. at 2449. See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466, 524-52 (2000).
87. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449. Justice O'Connor noted th at there are 168 death row inmates in
the fi ve states affected by Ring (Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska , and Ari zona) , and stated that
"each of whom is now li kely challenge hi s or her death sentence." /d. Also, there are 529 pri soners
on death row in the States whose capital sentencing schemes were ca lled into question. Those states
include Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. /d. at 2450.
88. /d. at 2449.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND lMPLICA TIONS

A. Quantitative Impact
The nme states affected by the ruling m Ring account for
approximately 797 of the nation's 3,700 death row inmates. 89 Justice
O'Connor notes that approximately 697 people have been sentenced to
die under the capital sentencing schemes that were invalidated or called
into question by Ring. 90 The impact of the Supreme Court's decision has
led some prosecutors to worry that "the weight of the system is going to
crush [them]."91 With regards to legislative reform, the states most
affected by Ring are now busy devising strategies that will keep the
convicted on death row and avoid a snowball effect of litigation. 92
The states anticipate that the ruling in Ring will likely bring an
increase in capital punishment litigation in the lower courts, particularly
as the persons awaiting execution appeal their capital sentences, attack
the constitutionality of the sentencing statutes and schemes, and ask for a
re-sentencing or even a re-trial. This anticipated docket load on an
already overworked judicial system should act as an impetus for state
legislatures to conform their capital sentencing standards to the
constitutional guarantees of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as keeping with the Ring triad. 93
There are important qualitative effects as a result of Ring. An
important consequence is the theoretical establishment of a bifurcated
system of prosecuting and sentencing capital offenses. This system is
predicated on constitutional guarantees, the defendant's presumption of
innocence and of life, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors
in sentencing, and deference to the national and international opinion.
The following sections discuss these qualitative effects in more detail.

R9. See John Gibeau!, States Revisit Death Sentence Cases: Prosecutors Look to Presen'e
Capital Rulings in wake of High Court Decision, I AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
EREPORT 25 (June 28, 2002).
90. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449-50. Justice O'Connor accounts that there are 168 prisoners on
death row in the five states whose capital sentencing schemes were declared unconstitutional. Those
states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho. Montana, and Nebraska. She also accounts for 529 more death
row inmates in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, whose hybrid capital sentencing systems
were called into question. The capital sentencing scheme in the second set of states is considered
hybrid because the jury renders an advisory verdict regarding punishment, but the judge makes the
ultimate sentencing determination.
91. See Gibeau!, supra note 89 (quoting Jerry M. Blair, president of the Florida Prosecuting
Attorneys Association).
92. !d
93. I use the term "'Ring triad" to mean the mlings of Ring, Apprendi, and Jones.
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B. Constitutional Guarantees and the Presumption ofLile
The rulings from Ring, Apprendi, and Jones facilitate procedures that
maintain the preeminence of the constitutional guarantees of the Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in both capital and non-capital
criminal cases. The Ring triad establishes a theoretical foundation of a
bifurcated system of prosecuting and sentencing capital offenses. This
bifurcated system is predicated upon the principle of presumption of
innocence of the defendant and broadens this presumption to preserving
the life of the convicted offender.
A bifurcated system is a procedural safeguard of the constitutional
guarantees of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in capital
cases. There are two phases or rounds in a bifurcated system. The first is
a trial phase where the state must prove that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the underlying offense. This
initial phase is a standard of the American criminal justice system. The
second phase involves sentencing the convicted defendant to die. The
threshold for imposing capital punishment would require the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the state is justified in
sentencing the defendant to death. This sentencing scheme would take
Blackstone's postulate that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape
than one innocent suffer" 94 to the echelon that it would be better for ten
guilty persons live in prison than one die innocently.
The presumption that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty is
the benchmark of the American justice system. This presumption is taken
one step further in light of Ring. While the presumption of innocence is
in keeping with the Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it naturally carries over to sentencing. The presumption
becomes that the defendant should get life in prison unless the state
proves beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors
that would convert life imprisonment into capital punishment. In other
words, the state must prove that the defendant's conviction leads to the
imposition of capital punishment only when the aggravating factors are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, overcoming the
presumption of life would determine that death is the appropriate
95
punishment for the convicted defendant and the particular offense.

94.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.

See generallv Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption o/Li/e: A Starting Pointji>r a
Due Process Analysis of" Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351 ( 1984).
95.
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C. The Jury and Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in
Sentencing

Even if the presumption of life is carried out in the sentencing phase,
there still remains an important issue that is left unanswered by Ring.
The question involves how the jury will consider any aggravating and
mitigating factors during sentencing. This is a particularly difficult issue
for legislatures to resolve, and it is imperative that the method of
weighing factors will ultimately result in the imposition of punishment
that guarantees the defendant's constitutional rights.
Whether aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against one
another or as a whole will depend on how much weight each factor
carries. Ring leaves several unanswered questions that are at the heart of
capital sentencing and the role of the juries in deciding whether or not to
impose the death penalty. Among these unanswered questions is whether
one mitigating factor outweighs an aggravating factor and vice-versa.
Also, would one aggravating factor outweigh two or more "smaller"
mitigating factors? Or should the aggravating and mitigating facts be
balanced as a whole? Also, should the jury find the aggravating and
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of
the evidence before deciding a sentence? Lastly, is the role of the jury in
capital sentencing advisory or conclusive? In other words, does Ring
allow the sentencing judge to divert from the jury findings?
In order to comply with the constitutional guarantees of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and in light of Ring, the jury should
consider the relevance of the aggravating factor vis-a-vis the mitigating
factor with respect to the underlying offense. This would ensure that
whatever factors the jury considers during sentencing are given a
relevant value to the individual defendant and the particular crime. This
method would be like a cost-benefit analysis with a social utility
undercurrent in the sense that the social utility would be avoiding the
imposition of an arbitrary punishment.
Convicting the defendant requires that the underlying offense be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of proof should carry
over to the sentencing phase where aggravating and mitigating factors
will be considered in determining the punishment. The reason that the
standard of proof is at its highest level during prosecution is due to the
value the criminal justice system places on the freedom and social stigma
of conviction . Similarly, the moral and social value of the life of the
convicted person mandates that the decision to execute the offender
should be reached using the highest level of scrutiny.
If the jury finds sufficient aggravating factors to put the defendant to
death, that decision should be reached unanimously. This procedural
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requirement is grounded on similar principles for finding guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt in capital offenses. lt would also demonstrate that the
jury's finding for imposing the death penalty has undergone strict
consideration and that the sentence is deemed the appropriate
punishment in the eyes of the jurors.
Even if the jury unanimously finds sufficient aggravating factors for
imposing the death penalty, the question remains whether the jury's
findings are advisory or conclusive and whether the sentencing judge is
bound to follow those findings. Under the Florida sentencing scheme, for
example, the jury renders an advisory verdict regarding punishment and
the sentencing judge retains discretionary power to make the ultimate
determination. In light of Ring, however, such a sentencing scheme
would be considered unconstitutional. For this reason, juries should issue
a final capital sentencing verdict that the judge could only invalidate if it
is outrageously inappropriate or if he has reason to believe the jury is not
impartial as directed by the Sixth Amendment.
A viable alternative to protect the defendant's due process and equal
protection rights in capital sentencing would include weighing the
aggravating and mitigating factors regarding their relevance to the crime
and defendant and issuing a non-advisory and unanimous sentencing
verdict. The ultimate issue remains whether such a scheme would protect
the defendant from undergoing cruel and unusual punishment. This
question can be answered by paying reasonable deference to national
trends and world opinion of capital sentencing and its attached
punishment.

D. Deference to National and International Opinion
The rhetoric from the Supreme Court is that it does not engage in
judicial activism, but a careful reflection of the Court's recent docket
suggests that the Court is an activist bench. 96 The Court has historically
considered trends and public perceptions concerning national issues and
has decided to be proactive in engaging in the dialogue, if not deciding
its outcome. 97 The role of national trends regarding capital sentencing
would necessarily include confronting public opinion of the sentencing
schemes, the increased use of DNA testing in capital crime prosecutions,
and the propensity of executing capital punishments across the nation.
Although the Court is by no means accountable to public opinion, it
should reasonably consider national trends regarding the death penalty,

96. See Bush v. Gore, 53 I U.S. 98 (2000).
97. See generally id: Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. I 13 (1973); Trop v. Dulles. 356 U.S 86 (195 8),
and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (I 955).
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i.e., determining the national view of cruel and unusual punishment and
whether or not the capital sentencing mechanisms are conducive to
uphold constitutional standards. Undoubtedly, the resulting opinions are
gross generalizations of American standards. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment contains "an evolving
standard of decency that mark[s] the progress of a maturing society."n In
order to determine what that "evolving standard" is, with regards to
capital sentencing and punishment, the Court should consider national
views and trends.
Just as the Court should pay reasonable deference to national trends
and the evolution of a national consensus, it should consider world
opinion regarding capital sentencing and punishment. Deference to world
opinion is not novel to the Supreme Court. In its last Term, the Supreme
Court heard Atkins v. Virginia and held that executing the mentally
retarded equated to cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the
Eight Amendment. 99 The Court's reasoning in Atkins notably referred to
the global opinion opposing the execution of adults who had the mental
capacity of a child. Also, the Court expressly looked to international
practices and opinion to assess what constitutes "evolving standards of
decency" for Eighth Amendment purposes in its holding in Trap v.
Dulles. 100 Likewise, the Court should consider international trends with
respect to capital sentencing schemes and standards.
International principles in private and public international law, in
addition to widely-accepted international norms, have historically been a
part of our domestic jurisprudence dating back to the nation's founding
and the earliest vestiges of English common law. 101 More importantly,
the Supreme Court has paid deference to world opinion in the past in
deciding benchmark cases. 102 In 1900, Justice Gray explained that
" international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice . ... [W]here there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations." 103
See Trop , 351i U.S. 86.
122 S. Ct. 2242 ,2252 (2002) .
356 U.S. at I 0 I.
Set! Haro ld Hongj u Koh, Edward L. Barrell . Jr. Lecture On Constitutional Law:, 35
U.C. D AV IS l. RE V. 1085, 1095 (2002).
102. See Trop, 356 U.S. 81i. See al.<o Reyno lds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, lli4 ( 1878)
(stating that "[p]ol ygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe." Koh, supra note I 0 I, at n .50); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 ( 1988) (the
majority evaluated the standards of executi ng minors in the Soviet Union and Western European
nations and took particularly careful note of the views of "other nati ons that share our AngloAmerican heritage." Koh. supra note 101. at 1099).
103. The Paquete Hahana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
98.
99 .
I 00.
I0I.
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Statistics are a reflection of the international opinion regarding
capital punishment. These statistics are stunning. For example, over
3,048 people were executed worldwide in 2001, an increase from I ,457
in 2000. 104 Four countries conducted 90% of these executions-China,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. 105 Only six countries have
publicly executed juveniles since 1990-Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and the United States. 106 As of this year, I 08 out of more
than 180 countries in the world have abolished the death penalty in law
or practice. 107 "European regional organizations have made abolition of
the death penalty a prerequisite to joining the new Europe, and a
cornerstone of European human rights policy." 108
Paying deference to international opinion- whether it is in the form
of public, private, or customary international law; or in the form of
global trends and norms- draws into question the enterprise of capital
punishment and the sentencing schemes behind it. Justice Blackmun,
shortly before his retirement from the Supreme Court, noted that
" [i]nternational law can and should inform the interpretation of various
clauses of the Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments." 109 With regards to the intent of the Eighth Amendment,
Blackmun stated that "[t]he drafters ... were concerned, at root, with
'the dignity of man,' and understood that 'evolving standards of
110
decency' should be measured, in part, against international norms. "
More importantly, "the Court has looked to both domestic custom and
the 'climate of international opinion' to determine what punishments are
cruel and unusual."'''
International opinion has formed the Supreme Court's understanding
of the social values of the nation from the founding. The Court has
internalized international law, norms, and trends in order to ascertain the
evolving standards that characterize an enlightened or "civilized
society." This deference to world opinion is not exclusive to maritime or
transactional law, but carries over to reconciling the capital punishment

104. Press Release, Amnesty International, Worldwide Executions Doubled in 2001 (Sept. 4,
2002), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/world04092002.html.
I 05. !d.
106. ld
I 07. See Death Pena lty Information Center, at http ://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.html
(last visited Dec. 4. 2002).
I 08. See Koh, supra note I 0 I, at II 05.
I 09. Harry A. Blackmun. Tribute: The Supreme Court and the Law of11/ations, 104 YALE L.J.
39, 45 (1994).
II 0. ld at 45-46.
II I. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n. I 0 (1977).
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question, and its mechanisms for sentencing, with the social utility of the
penalty.
V . CONCLUSION : UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE
ALTERNATIV ES

The ruling of Ring raises an important unresolved issue. The
question is whether the aggravating factors in the sentencing statutes
should be reconsidered or reformatted to become elements of the
underlying capital offense and charged as such. The uncertainty of this
question means that lower courts are already dealing with the fallout
from the Ring triad. 112 Although this note does not analyze the effect of
this question, the ruling from Ring provides a viable framework whereby
drafting capital sentencing schemes should more closely conform with
constitutional guarantees to ensure that the death penalty is not cruel,
unusual, arbitrary, or otherwise freakish.
There are capital sentencing statutes that would arguably pass muster
under the Ring triad standard. 113 These schemes, however, are the
exception rather than the rule. The Arkansas statute, for example, sets a
high standard for imposition of the death penalty. The sentencing statute
reads in pertinent part: "The jury shall impose a sentence of death if it
unanimously returns written findings that: ( 1) Aggravating circumstances
exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Aggravating circumstances
outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found
to exist; and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death
beyond a reasonable doubt." 114
The Arkansas statute provides an example of procedural safeguards
that the Ring Court sought to uphold. The sentencing scheme involves
the role of the jury in weighing aggravating factors and applies the
highest standard of proof in detennining the ultimate life or death of the
convicted person. The attempt to construct a sentencing scheme that
imposes the death penalty that complies with constitutional standards is
an overwhelming and worthwhile endeavor. It becomes the hope of the
judicial and legislative branches to create a procedural system that does
not become a "machinery of death .. . [that] lessens us all." 115

Simon Cantarero
11 2. See United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D.Va. 2002); United States v. Lentz,
225 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D.Va. 2002); Sanchez v . Superior Court, 126 Ca l. Rptr. 2d 200 (Ca l. 2d Dist.
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